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NOTE
RACE TO THE STARS: A FEDERALISM ARGUMENT FOR




T HIS Note will argue that, given the variation in the right of
publicity from state to state, and the relative newness of this
property right, Congress should refrain from passing a law to fed-
eralize it.' Although there are sound arguments for adopting this
right, there are also reasons to hesitate. Given that only half of the
states have adopted it, federalization seems premature. This Note
will only obliquely address the main objection usually leveled at a
robust right of publicity, namely that it stifles creativity and impli-
cates First Amendment concerns. The focus instead will be on the
right of individual states to choose not to create this property right
within their borders, and the workability of a state-based system
where rights of publicity are not uniform.
'The author would like to thank Professor Thomas W. Merrill for his help and
guidance with this Note.
A Joint Task Force of members of different committees of the Intellectual
Property Section of the American Bar Association has advocated a federal right of
publicity statute and drafted a model statute. The Section as a whole adopted a
resolution supporting a federal approach. Right of Publicity, 1994-1995 A.B.A. Sec.
Intell. Prop. L. Ann. Rep. 212, 212-15; Right of Publicity, 1995-1996 A.B.A. Sec.
Intell. Prop. L. Ann. Rep. 202, 250; see also Symposium, Rights of Publicity: An In-
Depth Analysis of the New Legislative Proposals to Congress, 16 Cardozo Arts &
Ent. L.J. 209 (1998) (panel discussion). In addition, many scholars have advocated
adopting federal right of publicity legislation to solve the problems created by a state-
based regime. See, e.g, Eric J. Goodman, A National Identity Crisis: The Need for a
Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 9 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. 227 (1999); Alice
Haemmerli. Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 Duke L.J.
383 (1999): Richard Masur, Right of Publicity From the Performer's Point of View, 10
DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. 253, 255-58 (2000); Kevin M. Fisher, Comment: Which
Path to Follow: A Comparative Perspective on the Right of Publicity, 16 Conn. J. Int'l
L. 95. 115 (2000).
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The right of publicity is a property right in the commercial use of
one's persona. Approximately half of the states recognize it.2 Some
of these make it descendible and assignable; in others, it expires
with death. Although publicity rights are conceptually related to
privacy rights, an area of tort law, the publicity right itself is a
property right in the elements of personal identity.' Privacy is a
more limited right, which usually protects names and likenesses
only." Privacy is a personal right that cannot be sold or given away,
and lasts only through a person's lifetime. Publicity, in contrast, is
alienable, may survive death, and has been expanded to protect a
person's voice, gestures, and mannerisms
The right of publicity occupies a somewhat liminal position in
the law. It is a property right, with the attendant characteristics of
alienability and, sometimes, heritability. Like most property rights,
it is state-created. But unlike most real property rights, its value is
connected with persons, and is therefore mobile. Celebrities have
received the ability to sue for commercial misappropriation even
when they cannot claim more traditional privacy rights, but the
cost of this creation of property rights has been uncertainty as to
how far these rights extend beyond the borders of a given state and
as to which state's laws govern a particular misappropriation.
As celebrities seek out more protection against commercial ex-
ploitation, the right of publicity is becoming increasingly
important. For example, in cases of digital manipulation, celebri-
ties' personas may be used to promote merchandise without their
consent. Action under the Lanham Act6 requires that there be con-
sumer confusion, which may not exist in today's age of savvy
marketing. There is no copyright claim if the image is not actually
copied, but rather recreated and manipulated in cyberspace. Imag-
ine a digital Marilyn Monroe hawking a certain kind of razor. She
could gush that, if only she had had it at the time, the subway scene
2 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerous Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 20 n.78 (2000).
3 Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity?, 9
DePaul-LCA . Art & Ent. L. 35,36 (1998).
4 Id. at 41 n.19.
Id.; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C (1977) (describing the tort of
appropriation of name or likeness).
615 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994). The Act protects trademarks and service marks that
identify and distinguish goods and services.
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in the Seven-Year Itch would have been so much easier to prepare
for. Consumers would not actually think that she was endorsing the
product, and there would be no original from which the digital
Marilyn was "copied." Could or should her heirs or assigns be able
to stop this use, because they do not want her image used in this
way? Do they have a right to share in the profits from it? States
address these questions by constructing various right of publicity
regimes.
After tracing the development of the right of publicity, this Note
will give a more detailed description of its current form. It will then
make a case for federalism in the area of the right of publicity, that
is, a case for maintaining the status quo and letting the states define
the right for themselves. To prove that states could reasonably dis-
agree as to the merits of a publicity rights regime, this Note will
examine the common justifications for the right as well as critical
responses to them. However, the choice that states confront is not
a simple all-or-nothing one: The fact that the right of publicity var-
ies so widely even among states that recognize it indicates that they
are experimenting with regard to various attributes of the right.7
This variation leads to conflicts as plaintiffs attempt to protect their
personas from exploitation in fora that may not recognize the right.
The Note will then present a solution for the most serious practical
problem that the current, state-based right of publicity regime
faces: choice-of-law conflicts. Finally, it will use the community
property system to illustrate how a property regime can success-
fully vary from state to state.
I. HISTORY
Commentators generally trace the development of the right of
publicity from the growth in the recognition of a right to privacy in
I In reaction to a Ninth Circuit decision finding for the defendant and protecting the
use of footage of Fred Astaire in a dance instruction video, Astaire v. Best Film &
Video Corp., 116 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1997), the California Legislature passed the
Astaire Celebrity Image Protection Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 3344.1 (West 1999). This act
provides that "[alny person who uses a deceased personality's name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or
for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products,
merchandise, goods or services, without prior consent" is liable for damages. Id. at
§ 3344.1(a)(1).
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this country with the publication of Samuel D. Warren and Louis
D. Brandeis's article, "The Right to Privacy."8 The property-like
status of the right of publicity arose as courts grappled with the
awkwardness of having to use the right of privacy to award dam-
ages to celebrities who deliberately sought the public eye, but
whose likenesses had been used without their consent., For exam-
ple, in O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co.,'" a beer producer used the
picture of a college football star on a promotional calendar." The
court concluded that a plaintiff who had exposed himself to the
public's eye in such a fashion had no plausible claim for privacy
protection and therefore denied his claim. 2 In Haelan Laboratories
v. Topps Chewing Gum,3 Judge Jerome Frank solved the problem
of protecting celebrities from nonconsensual commercial use by
creating a property right in persona. 4 Judge Frank saw the public-
ity right as a way to avoid the clumsy logic required whenever
public figures complained of an invasion of privacy.'5
From this pragmatic origin, the right of publicity has grown
enormously. 6 There was a time when personality was protected
8 Goodman, supra note 1, at 230, 232; Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
9Although some states do not limit the right of publicity cause of action to
celebrities, in practice only celebrities will usually have damages high enough to
warrant undertaking a suit. For the purposes of this Note, I will therefore refer to
plaintiffs and potential plaintiffs as celebrities. For an interesting case of a
noncelebrity privacy plaintiff, see Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E.
442 (N.Y. 1902).
10 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941).
"Id. at 168.
12 Id. at 170.
1202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
14 Id. at 868.
is Id.
16 Curiously enough, one could trace much of the history of this growth entirely
through baseball card and baseball statistic cases. The right was initially established in
a baseball card case, Haelen Laboratories, 202 F.2d 866. It was expanded in Allison v.
Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that resale of cards
mounted on plaques is defensible under the first-sale doctrine). Its limits were
explored in cases like Cardtoons L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d
959 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding the parody defense to be available even for commercial
use) and Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970) (holding that
the use of players' statistics in a trivia game was a commercial, not informational,
use). For a twist, a recent case involved a major league pitcher's characteristic stance
in a Killian's Beer advertisement. Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686 (9th
Cir. 1998).
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only under privacy, and the harm suffered was presumed to be an
invasion of privacy, rather than a deprivation of property. More re-
cently, the right of publicity has expanded in some states into a
robust property right that can protect various aspects of identity."
The only Supreme Court case to examine the right of publicity
was Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co." Zacchini sued a
local news program that had aired the entire fifteen seconds of his
"human cannonball" act performed at a county fair. The Court le-
gitimized both the right and the rationales behind it. It articulated
two broad reasons why Ohio would seek to protect the right of
publicity. First, the right of publicity prevents unjust enrichment; in
this case, the right served to protect not simply the performer's
reputation, but his very effort to gain fame and recognition. 9 Sec-
ond, it creates the economic incentive required to motivate
performers to engage in this sort of activity, free from the danger
that the resulting persona will be appropriated and some of the
proceeds diverted for the gain of another.'
The Court used the unusual facts of Zacchini's case to expand
further the right of publicity to include a broad "performance
right" in the publicity of an entertainer's entire performance.2'
"Zacchini thus signaled that the bundle of property entitlements an
entertainer receives under the right of publicity need not be limited
to the 'sticks' labeled name and likeness."' Later state cases have
protected a celebrity's nickname ("Crazylegs"), characteristic
phrase ("Here's Johnny"), and characters portrayed by the celeb-
rity ("Spanky" of the Little Rascals, and "Norm" and "Cliff" of
Cheers).2 While understandable in the case of Zacchini, this move
See Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 37-38.
'433 U.S. 562 (1977).
Id. at 576.
2" Id.
2' Id. at 575-76. "Moreover, the broadcast of petitioner's entire performance, unlike
the unauthorized use of another's name for purposes of trade or the incidental use of
a name or picture by the press, goes to the heart of petitioner's ability to earn a living
as an entertainer." Id. at 576. Because of its unusual circumstances, Zacchini's
protection of a performance right is a narrow protection. See Zimmerman, supra note
3, at 50.
- Arlen W. Langvardt, The Troubling Implications of a Right of Publicity "Wheel"
Spun Out of Control, 45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 329,357 (1997).
2, Id. at 387-93. In the last case, Host International put in its bars animatronic
figures that plaintiffs George Wendt and John Ratzenberger claimed resembled them.
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to protect various isolatable features of celebrities' likenesses and
personas has proved controversial.
"Soundalike" cases, which involve efforts by marketers to use
singers who can duplicate the distinctive voices and styles of fa-
mous singers, were rejected until the late 1980s. For example, in
Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co.,' the First Circuit rejected claims of
rights of publicity and privacy violations for appropriation of
voice.' Nancy Sinatra similarly failed in an attempt to press a pub-
licity claim against Goodyear Tires for employing singers who
imitated her vocal style. Goodyear had obtained permission from
the copyright holders to use the song "These Boots Were Made for
Walking."' By the 1980s, however, Bette Midler and Tom Waits
were able to win on right of publicity grounds in soundalike cases.'
The cases turned on whether the imitation was that of a specific re-
cording, which would be governed by federal copyright law, or that
of unique voice style, which is an attribute protected under the
right of publicity, at least in California. Some commentators think
that courts have gone too far in this realm, granting celebrities
property rights in attributes that are not unique, but rather com-
mon in a large segment of the population.'
The case that has stretched the limits of right of publicity protec-
tion the furthest to date is White v. Samsung Electronics America,
Inc.29 In that case, Samsung advertised the longevity of its video
cassette recorders with the image of a robot in an evening gown,
adorned with jewelry and a blonde wig, by the Wheel of Fortune
set, captioned "Longest-Running Game Show, 2012 A.D."3 Al-
though some commentators do not believe jewelry, a blonde wig,
and an evening gown alone should be enough to trigger right of
publicity protection, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff,
Vanna White, had demonstrated sufficient issues of fact to warrant
The Ninth Circuit refused to take a position on whether the characters "Norm" and
"Cliff" could be part of the plaintiffs' identities. Id. at 393 n.412.
24300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962).
25Id. at 258.
26Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970).
2'See Waits v. Frito-Lay, 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,
849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
28 See White v. Samsung Elec. Am., 989 F.2d 1512,1516 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting). See generally Langvardt, supra note 22.
29971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
n Id. at 1396.
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a jury trial." Granting property fights in such common attributes
could result in a race to the courthouse, as individuals attempt to
claim hairstyles or accessories as their personal property and reap
the financial rewards that such property rights afford them.
The right of publicity at the present time varies widely from state
to state. It is a right created by states, either through statute or
common law. Twenty-seven states currently have some form of the
right. 2 Others do not recognize the right at all. Even among states
that recognize the right, its parameters differ dramatically. In Flor-
ida, publicity rights last forty years after the death of the celebrity.3
Kentucky, Texas, and Nevada provide rights that will lapse after
fifty years; California's right lapses after seventy years.' In Indiana
and Oklahoma the right survives one hundred years after the death
of the celebrity." Finally, Tennessee and Nebraska allow the right
to continue indefinitely, although in Tennessee publicity rights will
terminate if they are not used for two consecutive years. Varia-
tions also exist in what aspects of persona (for example, voice,
gestures, or mannerisms) are protected and in whether the right is
assignable or descendible.37 Potential remedies for a right of public-
ity action include injunctions and damages.'
II. THE BENEFITS OF FEDERALISM IN THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
CONTEXT
This Part presents several arguments for retaining the current
system of state-based rights of publicity. First, since half of the
states have not recognized the right at all, there is no clear resolu-
tion that protection of the right of publicity is a benefit. To use the
terms current in federalism arguments, the question of whether the
,, Id. at 1408.
12 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 2, at 20 n.78; Bruce P. Keller & David H.
Bernstein, The Right of Publicity: Towards a Federal Statute?, 532 PLI/Pat 413, 418
n.12 (1998).





1Keller & Bernstein, supra note 32, at 418 n.12.
J. Eugene Salomon, Jr., Note, The Right of Publicity Run Riot: The Case for a
Federal Statute, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1179, 1205 (1987).
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right of publicity is a race to the top or bottom remains unan-
swered. Even if the right of publicity is judged to be
unquestionably beneficial, the ideal form of that right remains un-
certain. Federalism can function here as it does in corporate law, to
help determine the best form of the right. Alternatively, different
states may experiment with various formulations of the rule and
enact those that best meet their specific needs. This Part also ad-
dresses potential criticisms of the application of federalism
arguments to the right of publicity, most notably the contention
that states would never compete for celebrities as they do for cor-
porations. Finally, this Part makes the doctrinal point that in
general, our system allows the states to define property rights. The
ultimate conclusion is that there are too many unresolved ques-
tions about the most advisable features of a right of publicity for it
to be enshrined in federal law yet.
Economist proponents of federalism and their critics implicitly
agree that there is a right answer. If competition produces the most
efficient result, it is described as a race to the top, a qualitative
good. If competition for corporate charters and industry causes
shareholders or the environment to lose out, then it is a race to the
bottom, which is by definition qualitatively bad. Professor Richard
Revesz points out that these assumptions may be false: "If one be-
lieves that competition among sellers of widgets is socially
desirable, why is competition among sellers of location rights so-
cially undesirable?"39
One reason that competition in the case of the environment
could be undesirable flows from a public goods argument. If every-
one benefits equally from clean air and water, individual states
have a disincentive to tax their citizens. They will not capture the
full benefit of a reduction of air and water pollution, and they
could simply free-ride off of the pollution-reduction actions of
other states. Only a national government can tax the national class
of beneficiaries.
However, a public goods argument for the federalization of the
right of publicity is fairly weak. The right of publicity system cur-
39David L. Shapiro, Federalism: A Dialogue 81 (1995) (citing Richard Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom"
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210, 1234
(1992)).
[Vol. 87:12011208
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rently in place has succeeded in extracting "user fees" from those
who benefit from it, and paying those fees to the celebrities who
are able to sue under state laws. For example, the reason one
brand of perfume might cost more is because the consumer must
subsidize the payment of publicity rights to Elizabeth Taylor,
whose endorsement of the product is what led the consumer to se-
lect it. This higher cost is a "user fee."' More fundamentally, it is
not clear that celebrities are "pure" public goods where the entire
nation benefits equally. In other words, before imposing a national
"tax" by federalizing the right of publicity under a public goods ra-
tionale, there must be agreement that protection of people's right
to control commercial exploitation of their personas grants a na-
tionwide benefit that individual states are deterred from providing
on their own.
In the right of publicity context, as perhaps in many competitive
contexts, the application of "race to the top" and "race to the bot-
tom" language may prove unhelpful, since the question of which
end is "up" remains unresolved. For a true believer in the necessity
of protecting celebrities from exploitation in all cases, the race to
the bottom would mean a situation where states allow corporations
to trade on the publicity value of celebrities without compensating
the performers (of course, federal trademark and false endorse-
ment protections would limit this permissiveness), while a race to
the top would maximize protection of rights in one's persona. For
one who believes the danger lies in celebrities curtailing free
speech and imposing fees that drive up the costs of products, the
specter of states catering to celebrities at the expense of consumers
makes that same scenario a race to the bottom.41 The states have
- One could argue that celebrities' images are a public good that all must pay for in
order to avoid free riding problems. A better reading of the argument is that images
are impure public goods. Consumers who enjoy the image enough pay a user fee in
the form of increased price, while those that do not enjoy it pay nothing. See Shapiro,
supra note 39, at 82-83. An analogy between dilution of image and the unworkable
nature of a piecemeal broadcast system loses its bite where copyright and false
endorsement protection continue to exist.
,,The fact that New York and California, two states with a high number of
celebrities. have been leaders in the expansion of the right of publicity suggests that
celebrities, in these states at least, are a powerful interest group. If one accepts public
choice analysis and disapproves of the power of interest groups to gain concessions,
another argument in favor of keeping the right of publicity state-determined emerges.
Rather than the Madisonian view of the national government as a counter to
20011 1209
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not uniformly embraced the right of publicity, especially as a dis-
tinct property right. Given the various criticisms that can be leveled
at such a right,42 and the current variations in its definition, it seems
premature to choose one side's value system over another's and
enshrine it as the national rule.
In addition, beyond the simple binary of accepting or rejecting a
right of publicity, there is another factor to consider: the optimal
form a right of publicity should take. Currently state regimes vary
greatly as to assignability, survivability, and protected features.43
Analogizing to the corporate context, the argument there is not
whether states are racing to the top or bottom in their choice of
whether or not to have corporate law: All states have corporate
law. The argument that Delaware is the best state in which to in-
corporate because features such as a sophisticated judiciary and
well-developed case law lead to a level of stockholder protection
optimal for wealth maximization finds an analogue in the right of
publicity context: Federalism is important because through compe-
tition, the best form of right of publicity law can emerge.
One argument against the competition justification for a state-
based right of publicity is that states would never compete for ce-
lebrities the way they would for corporations. The choice of
domicile for a celebrity is more likely to be driven by convenience,
personal preference, and career concerns than by the perceived ur-
gency of protecting one's image. It is therefore unlikely that a star
would use his or her right of exit as quickly as a corporation might.
Still, at least one judge has argued differently: "[I]t would be ra-
tional for the Tennessee courts to adopt a policy enhancing the
continued growth of Nashville and Memphis as centers for the lives
and activities of music industry personalities."' This comment of a
New York federal appellate judge on the likely rulings of a Ten-
nessee state court may prove inaccurate, but it is noteworthy that
factionalism, public choice theory suggests that interest groups can gain more on the
national scene. Id. at 80-81. Even if in the case of the right of publicity the opponents
of the right on the state level are no less dispersed than they are on the national level,
the federal system's inherent barrier of requiring separate action in all fifty states may
be a useful counter to easy interest group access to the national government.
42 See infra Part III.
43 See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
- Factors Etc. v. Pro Arts, 652 F.2d 278, 288 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting).
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this judge recognizes the protection of celebrities in order to en-
courage a state entertainment industry as a potential and legitimate
state goal.
Even without the direct vying for celebrities which classic com-
petition analysis would imply, federalism is also premised on the
notion that state experimentation is beneficial to the nation as a
whole. This argument assumes "that a well-conceived and
smoothly operating federal system is one in which policy emerges
as part of a process and from the interplay of a multiplicity of
sources."4' The Brandeis version of this argument 6 conceives of the
states as laboratories that experiment and ultimately discover the
best national solution." In the right of publicity context, presuma-
bly the "best" would mean the ideal balance of speech protection
and celebrity protection which does not raise the price of marketed
goods "too much."' An alternate version of federalism allows dif-
ferent strokes for different states, recognizing that different
constituencies and situations might entail different solutions for the
same policy problem." Given the right of publicity's character as an
informational property right, and the problems of conflict of laws
that will be discussed later, the Brandeis model seems like the best
one. Since no consensus has yet emerged on what makes the best
right of publicity system, however, this model would counsel keep-
ing the issue firmly in state hands for now.
Finally, there is the elementary proposition that it is the states
that traditionally define property rights in our system of govern-
ment. This observation is so basic that it is not often articulated in
law review articles or cases. Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
' Shapiro, supra note 39, at 77.
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
'7 Shapiro, supra note 39, at 85.
A counterargument is that there is no such thing as "too high" a price to pay for
celebrity. If the price a celebrity demands is too high, producers will turn to another
celebrity. Zimmerman, at least, would respond to this that property rights should only
be recognized when they are value-creating, and there is a presumption against
property rights in information and image. Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 81-82. This
relates to the Demsetz theory that property rights arise when it becomes efficient to
have them. Consistent with this theory, Zimmerman argues that there is no need to
create a property right in a celebrity's image because celebrity will be cultivated even
without it. Id. at 77.
'1 Shapiro, supra note 39, at 85.
2001] 1211
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Roth' treats it as a given: "Property interests, of course, are not
created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their di-
mensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law."'" It is true that the
federal government protects individual rights in takings cases,' 2 and
the Constitution gives it the power to control intellectual property
such as copyright. 3 The Federal Communications Commission also
provides federal regulation of broadcast media in cases where cen-
tral regulation is needed in order for meaningful property rights to
exist. But these are exceptions to a general rule of state dominion
over the definition of property, a power that states will guard jeal-
ously in the current political climate emphasizing state sovereignty
and control.
The main point is that there is no consensus on what level of
protection celebrities should be afforded. There are justifications
for the right of publicity and criticisms of those justifications. Until
a more general agreement is reached, it would be premature to en-
shrine one version of the right as national law. Instead, we should
allow the states to experiment with different right of publicity
schemes. Even assuming that we might later decide to bestow na-
tional recognition on a property right in personas, we should still
wait for a broader consensus to emerge.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND POTENTIAL
CRITICISMS
This Part presents common justifications for the right of public-
ity and counterarguments to those justifications. The justifications
include the theories of labor, unjust enrichment, personal auton-
omy, incentive, efficiency, and consumer confusion. The aim of this
Part is to show that states have good reasons to adopt the right,
and sound reasons to reject it or limit it, as well. Not only must
each state decide whether, on the whole, the arguments for or
against the right of publicity are more persuasive; each state must
-408 U.S. 564 (1972).
5S Id. at 577.
- See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
51 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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also decide how robust or weak to make the right, and these argu-
ments inform that decision.
After the Haelen Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum 4 deci-
sion, Professor Melville Nimmer published the influential article,
"The Right of Publicity."" In it, he argued that celebrities' invest-
ment of time, skill, money, and effort combined to make their
names and likenesses economically valuable to promoters. 6 Profes-
sor Nimmer proposed a labor theory of the right of publicity: A
celebrity, like anyone else who labors to create something, de-
serves to profit from his or her labors.57 The Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co 8 Court endorsed this justification for the
right of publicity. 9 States can justify publicity laws that encourage
entertainers and creative artists with the same rationale of encour-
aging individual creative effort that prompted patent and copyright
laws.'
There are several criticisms that can be levied at this labor the-
ory of the right of publicity, however. Some critics argue that
fortuity, more than talent or expenditure of effort, causes celeb-
rity." "Critics of the labor/property rationale also note that a
celebrity's fame seldom results solely from his or her labor. In-
stead, the public-through its reaction to the supposed 'laborer'-
serves as the ultimate determinant of whether the would-be celeb-
rity becomes a celebrity in fact."'62 This theory might also suggest
that in the White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.3 case it
should have been Merv Griffin Productions, the labor-expending
purveyor of the Wheel of Fortune game show, and not Vanna
White, who had a cause of action in a right of publicity case.
A related argument by celebrities' proponents is that defendants
who capitalize on the image of a celebrity to sell a product are un-
202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
Melville Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 Law & Contemp. Probs. 203 (1954).
Id. at 216.
"Id.
"433 U.S. 562 (1977).
Id. at 576-77.
" Id.
"Langvardt, supra note 22, at 337. Langvardt uses Brian "Kato" Kaelin as perhaps
the ultimate example. See id. at 337 n.50.
Id. at 337-38.
971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
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justly enriching themselves, free-riding on the work of others.64
However, this justification assumes an entitlement.65 It is not a
foregone conclusion that the creation of something valuable pre-
supposes a property right.' Creating private rights is a departure
from the norm that should be reserved for important social goals,
as in the case of copyright.67 Even if audiences are not the ones who
create the publicity value, celebrities' images still require develop-
ment and marketing. The purveyor of the image is a necessary,
though not sufficient, part of the creative process-a co-creator.'
An economic argument against the unjust enrichment justifica-
tion for the right of publicity also exists. The defendants are the
public's proxy, and if no one controls celebrities' images, then the
consumer pays less. If the "free-riding" seller is deriving too much
profit from using the image, then competition will correct the prob-
lem when another seller steps in to benefit from the use of the
same image."9 The publicity value may be a surplus, "the economic
space between the most a consumer would be willing to pay and
the minimum price for which the manufacturer is willing to sell."7
Given the choice of distributing the surplus to consumers or to ce-
lebrities, the traditional antitrust and intellectual property solution
is to give it to consumers." To give it to the celebrities when there
are no proven economic benefits to doing so is bad policy.'
Another justification offered is that of protecting personal
autonomy. The intuition is that a person's identity is their own,
64 Richard Cameron Cray, Comment, Choice of Law in Right of Publicity, 31 UCLA
L. Rev. 640, 642-43 nn.23-24 (1984).
6Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 78.
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We
Be Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 Colum.-
VLA J.L. & Arts 123,142 (1996).
67 Id. at 142-43.
6Id. at 141.
6Id.
10 Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 80-81.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 81. "Unless shifting more financial rewards to the famous convincingly gets
us a more desirable level of celebrity, or a product that we want and would not
otherwise have, publicity claimants do not have a legally compelling claim for a dollar
more of the surplus value associated with their fame." Id. at 81-82.
73 For a discussion of the distinction between the labor justification and that of
personal autonomy, presented as a distinction between Lockean and Kantian
philosophy, see Haemmerli, supra note 1.
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and they should control it and choose when and how it is ex-
ploited." The choice of whether or not to exploit public recognition
is an assertion of personality, one which affects the image the pub-
lic sees. For example, the singer Tom Waits has a "no
commercial" policy and was able to win an award of almost $2.5
million in a soundalike suit in a case where Frito-Lay hired a singer
who closely imitated Waits's voice.76 Waits feared that his fans
would believe he had sold out.' Still, this justification fails to ac-
count for the survivability feature of the right of publicity. After a
celebrity's death, the personal autonomy interest no longer exists.
In addition, one could argue that, if personal autonomy is the in-
terest we seek to protect, we should not permit the transfer or sale
of publicity rights. Otherwise a person would lose control over his
or her own persona."
The incentive rationale is that, without the protection of com-
mercial use of their personas that the right of publicity affords
celebrities, they will have a diminished incentive to create, leading
to the social harm of less creativity." Even advocates of this posi-
tion, however, admit that many celebrities are not primarily
motivated by the protection that publicity rights afford them.' The
right of publicity creates only a marginal increase in incentives. The
idea that the right of publicity affects the amount of celebrities' ex-
ertion more than tangentially is "empirically dubious."81
Comparative law provides empirical proof that it is particularly
unlikely: "Proof of this [the falsity of the incentive rationale] can
' Keller & Bernstein, supra note 32, at 416; see also Salomon, supra note 38, at 1186
(stating that concerns over personal autonomy provide a disincentive to create in
states where there is no right to publicity).
71 Salomon, supra note 38, at 1189.
Waits v. Frito-Lay, 978 F.2d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1104.
71 One of Salomon's arguments for having a right of publicity is to help struggling
young musicians who can depend on this right early on in their careers-answering
objections to the incentive rationale that will be discussed below with the argument
that publicity rights have real value early on in a career. Salomon, supra note 38, at
1185. But if these rights do have value, then it seems clear that agents who are
promoting the performers, or whoever else may be financing them, will demand that
their clients assign their rights away as a condition of employment. Giving someone a
property right does not guarantee that they will be able to profit from it.
Id. at 1185-86.
Id. at 1186 n.49.
Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 77.
2001] 1215
Copyright 2001 Virginia Law Review, used by permission
1216 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 87:1201
be found in the fact that many countries-Great Britain, for exam-
ple-produce quite a healthy crop of persons committed to
becoming celebrities without the help of a legally recognized pub-
licity right. ' It is also true that, as a rule, "the costs of creating a
persona are recaptured through the activity with which the pur-
veyor is primarily associated. ' Consider the incentives of fame
itself, and the money that usually accompanies it in the form of re-
cord sales, movie deals, endorsements, and other revenue streams
more closely tied to whatever makes a person a celebrity. Given
these incentives, it seems ludicrous to imagine that entertainers will
be dissuaded from pursuing their artistic aspirations because of the
potential of a loss of control over the marketing of that small area
of persona that the right of publicity, but not the Copyright Act or
Lanham Act, covers.' Still, the incentive argument appears both in
Zacchini and in Professor Nimmer's articleY It could even be that
the right creates the wrong incentives. Celebrities no longer have
to improve their image by excelling in their field of expertise, but
can rather rest on their laurels, making money off their past acts.
For example, one commentator suggests that the 1995 baseball and
hockey strikes were made possible by the financial freedom that
merchandising revenue afforded players.' To the extent that false
endorsement and consumer confusion failed to protect these celeb-
rities from commercial exploitation, this surplus income derives
from the right of publicity.
An efficiency justification for the right of publicity posits that
granting exclusive property rights is the most efficient way to allo-
cate scarce resources.' This "induces the advertiser with the
highest-valued use to purchase the right to use the identity at the
market price."' Professor Diane Leenheer Zimmerman decries
lawmakers' and creators' instinct to claim property rights in infor-
2 Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Fitting Publicity Rights Into Intellectual Property
and Free Speech Theory: Sam, You Made the Pants Too Long!, 10 DePaul-LCA J.
Art & Ent. L. 283,306 (2000).
8 Dreyfuss, supra note 66, at 144.
8, As will be seen, causes of action like false endorsement may also help protect
celebrities' rights.
15 Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 48 n.39, 49.
66 Dreyfuss, supra note 66, at 145.
87 Keller & Bernstein, supra note 32, at 417.
91 Id. (citation omitted).
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mation and divide up the "informational commons."" The re-
sources in question here are only scarce if we assume that overuse
that will deplete the resource is possible. The counterargument is
that if a celebrity cannot control the use of his or her image and
guarantee its exclusivity to advertisers, the image is worth less.'
This is probably the most convincing argument for the right yet ar-
ticulated, but if image dilution is not a problem, it loses force. For
example, the Easter Bunny, Santa Claus, and Impressionist paint-
ings are examples of cultural capital that do not appear to have lost
too much resonance, despite widespread circulation.9 In addition,
even without the right of publicity, celebrities would still be able to
bring false endorsement claims covering their names and likenesses
in their lifetime, which should obviate much of the dilution prob-
lem.
Consumer confusion is at issue in the right of publicity context,
as it is in the trademark context.? But it is not a prerequisite for a
right of publicity cause of action.' All one must prove is identifi-
ability, which is easily accomplished since it is generally in a
defendant's interest to make the identity of the celebrity obvious.'
Mere intent to trade on the goodwill of the plaintiff is enough.' To
a degree, this aspect of the right of publicity has already been fed-
eralized. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act has been construed to
protect personal images.' Using the false endorsement criteria of
Section 43(a) would preserve several elements of the current right
of publicity protection, as it exists in the states that recognize it, in-
cluding use of name, likeness, or identity in a commercial setting
and lack of consent." A false endorsement claim, however, would
necessitate an additional requirement not typically found in right
of publicity law: "proof of the likelihood of consumer confusion
concerning whether the plaintiff endorses the defendant's goods or
" Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 51-52.
See Salomon, supra note 38, at 1193-94.
' Dreyfuss, supra note 66, at 141.
-Richard S. Robinson, Preemption, the Right of Publicity, and a New Federal
Statute, 16 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 183, 191 (1998).
- Id. at 192.
- Keller & Bernstein, supra note 32, at 433-34.
Id. at 434.
Dreyfuss, supra note 66, at 126.
° Langvardt, supra note 22, at 354.
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services or is otherwise affiliated with the defendant."' This addi-
tional sorter would exclude White-like cases, where consumers are
not likely to suspect that a celebrity has endorsed the product be-
ing sold. It would probably have the practical effect of granting a
parody exception to the right of publicity.
This Part has discussed the common justifications for the right of
publicity and counterarguments against them. But this does not
mean that federalism's laboratory will have to conclude its experi-
ments by rendering a yes-or-no judgment on the right of publicity.
On the contrary, the fact that half of the states have adopted some
form of the right means that it is likely here to stay. Takings law
makes clear that rights, once vested, are hard to take away. The
question remains: If a state decides to recognize the right of public-
ity, what should the contours of the right be? States should
consider the justifications for having the right and their counter-
arguments when deciding how expansive or narrow to make the
right. If the rationale accepted is one of personal autonomy, then
the right should terminate upon death, when the individual auton-
omy no longer needs protection. If the justification is incentive-
based, states may want to look at the decreasing marginal utility of
extending the right for decades after a celebrity's death. If a state
embraces the labor theory, then perhaps the fruit of the celebrity's
work should continue in perpetuity, just like that of a family farm
or family business.
California has a state law regime that many think is expansive, as
exemplified by White v. Samsung Electronics America." There, a
robot dressed with a blonde wig, evening gown, and jewelry was
deemed to infringe on Vanna White's right of publicity." One
scholar, Professor Arlen W. Langvardt, rejects the idea that the
Wheel of Fortune set pictured in the advertisement was a personal
attribute of Ms. White."' If anyone should sue, he argues, it should
be the copyright holder in the show."° One of the dangers he sees
in the White decision is the prospect of an "Orwellian" world
where attenuated reference is enough to trigger liability. Another
9Id.
-971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
0" Id. at 1399.
101 Langvardt, supra note 22, at 419.
Im Id. at 423-24.
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danger is that it creates a property right without limits."° This en-
hances copyright conflicts and threatens freedom of expression.
Potential defendants may also have no notice that they are infring-
ing. Professor Langvardt suggests instead that the right be limited
to personal and unique attributes, 4 that the law require proof of
the likelihood of confusion," and that there be more of an effort to
accommodate First Amendment interests °6
IV. REASONS FOR FEDERALIZING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Some of the arguments for federalizing the right of publicity
flow naturally from acceptance of the justifications set out above.
For example, if one accepts that the economic and persouhood
concerns addressed by the right of publicity outweigh the expres-
sive value of commercial speech, one would endorse federalizing
right of publicity protection. 7 A First Amendment exception could
then protect image use in news and entertainment." s
A separate issue is the current intertwining of state and federal
law, and the hazy boundary between the two that potential litigants
must traverse. The practical version of this story is that intelligent
plaintiffs will usually include federal claims in their causes of ac-
tion, such as claims based on Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,"°  so
that most cases are heard before federal courts. This explains the
fact that in the right of publicity area, much of the "state law" that
we have actually stems from federal courts hypothesizing about
how a state court would rule.
There are potential conflicts between the right of publicity, fed-
eral copyright law, and the Lanham Act. The question of
preemption looms large. Section 301 of the Copyright Act pre-
empts state-created rights that are equivalent to those created by
the Copyright Act and that cover the same subject matter as the
Id. at 418-22.
" Id. at 440-43.
' Id. at 443-47. Langvardt argues that not requiring consumer confusion is a
mistake because it eliminates the possibility of commercial parody. Id. at 353.
Id. at 447-51.
. See Salomon, supra note 38, at 1194.
yId.
"Symposium, supra note 1, at 213.
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Act."' While some commentators believe that the Act preempts
the right of publicity, others disagree, either because a persona is
not a writing or because the right protects an interest different
from copyright."1
The Lanham Act is another area of potential conflict for right of
publicity causes of action. A federal right of publicity may be re-
quired if plaintiffs cannot rely on the Lanham Act for full
protection. The Act requires the involvement of goods and ser-
vices, an effect on interstate commerce, and false designation of
origin or description."' The Act also requires potential deception,
so there are cases protected under the right of publicity that the
Lanham Act would not protect."'3
The chief attraction of a uniform federal law is that it would
solve the formidable problems of uncertainty that both plaintiffs
and defendants face in this arena. It would reduce the costs to po-
tential defendants, who would otherwise have to investigate the
laws of each state in which they wished to advertise."4 It would also
reduce the confusion occasioned by state variations as to whether
the commercial value of the persona must be exercised lest it be
deemed waived."5 As we will see, the uncertainty occasioned by
choice of forum and choice of law is also a major concern in these
cases."6 The burden of nationwide enforcement is considerable if
state court remedies are limited to in-state infringement."" Thus, a
federal right of publicity would give celebrities the incentive to
create by lowering the cost of enforcement related to protecting
one's image."
It is clear, however, that these arguments are most persuasive to
those who already have the faith. Those who refuse to accept the
right of publicity as an unmitigated, unquestionable blessing can
rely on the Lanham Act and Copyright Act to protect the most
egregious, false-endorsement sort of behavior, and conflicts with
110 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
"I Salomon, supra note 38, at 1187.
11215 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994).
13 Salomon, supra note 38, at 1196.
114 Id. at 1181.
115 Id. at 1190.
16 Id. at 1180.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 1185.
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these federal statutes no longer pose such a problem. One might
object that, given the enforcement and choice of law difficulties,
limiting plaintiffs to state causes of action diminishes the bite of the
fight of publicity-but there is no requirement that national law be
changed to maximize state causes of action. Property is tradition-
ally a realm reserved to the states, and the state-varied property
regime of community property has existed for centuries.
The fact that the law of the right of publicity is not clearly settled
does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the federal gov-
ernment must step in to resolve the disputed issues. An equally
plausible reading of the current situation is that the states are still
trying to work out the proper contours of a relatively young right
(by property law standards, at least), and the federal government
should wait until state law has solidified. Most states have ad-
dressed cases of commercial appropriation of identity only rarely,
if at all.1 ' Examples are Alaska, Minnesota, and New Hampshire."
Although twenty-seven states have recognized a form of the right
of publicity, "only about a dozen have taken unambiguous steps to
create a true property fight.""'
V. THE CHOICE OF LAW PROBLEM
The boundaries of right of publicity law are unclear in many
states. One case describes the law in this area as resembling "a hay-
stack in a hurricane."'" Compounding the problem is the lack of
sensitivity in many cases to choice of law issues. Even if many
states have an interest in the outcome of a decision, courts are of-
ten inclined to apply their own state's law mechanically."
One example of the complications choice of law can pose is
Groucho Marx Productions v. Day and Night Co. 4 This case in-
volved a Broadway musical called A Day in Hollywood, A Night in
the Ukraine and three performers who reproduced the comic style
" Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 40.
Id. at 40 n.17.
Id. at 41. Zimmerman only lists California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky,
Nevada, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas, however. Id. at 41 n.19.
12- Cray, supra note 64, at 642 n.19 (citing Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp.,
229 F.2d 481. 485 (3d Cir. 1956)).
- Id. at 646.
-' 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
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of Groucho, Chico, and Harpo Marx. The District Court for the
Southern District of New York ruled that New York law governed,
since the play ran longest there, and the Marx Brothers characters
were originally developed in New York." The Second Circuit re-
versed, ruling that a New York court would apply California law,
since the Marx Brothers were California residents at their deaths,
and the plaintiff was a California corporation.'26 Further, before his
death Groucho assigned his right of publicity to the plaintiff with a
contract executed in California. 7 Finally, Chico's estate did the
same eighteen years after his death.'" Cases in which a trial court is
reversed on appeal for failing to consider choice of law constraints,
or for ruling incorrectly on them, are fairly common."9
The scope of permissible power that a state has over action in
other states is another side of the choice of law issue. California,
Kentucky, Florida, Oklahoma, Utah, and Virginia statutes do not
require that the exploited individual or the defendant reside in the
state, or that the commercial use take place in the state.' The de-
fendant can theoretically be brought in with a long-arm statute by
selling products or showing ads within the state. Defendants have
no way to predict when they will be liable. If courts fail to apply
conventional choice of law analysis, then the "race to the bottom"
may already be over; any celebrity could theoretically sue under
these statutes. This has not proven to be the case, however. The
choice of law decisions, at least thus far, seem to be counteracting
plaintiffs' efforts to use certain states to sue when there is no real
115 Id. at 319.
116 Id. at 320.
'27 Id.
121 Cray, supra note 64, at 650 (citing Groucho Marx Prods., 689 F.2d at 320).
129 See Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1445 n.6, 1446-47 (11th Cir.
1998) (affirming the trial court's ruling, but noting that the district court did not
adequately address the choice of law issue); Salomon, supra note 38, at 1182 (citing
Southeast Bank N.A. v. Lawrence, 489 N.E.2d 744 (N.Y. 1985), in which New York's
highest court ruled that a Manhattan theater called the "Tennessee Williams" was
governed by Florida law although both parties and the lower courts thought New
York law controlled); see also Factors Etc. v. Pro Arts, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981)
(holding that Tennessee law, not New York law, governed in a case determining
whether a corporation formed by Elvis Presley had exclusive rights to merchandize
his name and likeness after his death, when Tennessee was both where Presley was
domiciled and where the corporation was incorporated). For a list of cases with choice
of law analyses, see Cray, supra note 64, 643 n.28.
130 Salomon, supra note 38, at 1180-81.
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connection to the forum. For example, in a recent case, a federal
court denied a claim under California law because the claimant
sued on behalf of Princess Diana, who, at the time of her death,
was domiciled in Britain, which does not recognize the right of
publicity."'
The question of remedy is another potential stumbling block.
Plaintiffs might have to bring fifty-one separate suits in order to
prevent commercial exploitation of their personas nationwide. Al-
ternatively, damages could be reduced to those within the state
declaring judgment. Or perhaps defendants could persuade a court
to limit damages to the amount available in states where the plain-
tiff could win.112 This last possibility actually seems the most fair,
but it would involve the burdensome examination of the law of
fifty states. Still, this type of remedy was imposed when Johnny
Carson sued a portable toilet company. He obtained a nationwide
injunction prohibiting the company from using the name "Here's
Johnny!," but the defendant could eliminate states if it could show
that the sale was legal there.133
Two alternative solutions to the choice of law problem may be
workable. The first comes from Richard Cameron Cray, who advo-
cates federal legislation to make right of publicity law uniform, but
in the alternative, endorses suit in the place of greatest infringe-
ment as the next best solution.TM
To some extent, the use of any single state's law to govern a con-
troversy with significant multistate consequences will be inherently
arbitrary. Nonetheless, where one can discern a state of greatest in-
fringement, applying that state's law to the right of publicity
controversy will be less arbitrary than applying law selected
through choice of law factors that do not focus upon the situs of the
alleged injury. -
In federalism terms, this would allow states to vary the protec-
tion celebrities receive within their borders. It might well be in a
state's interest to encourage in-state individual enterprise and crea-
tivity by vigorously enforcing celebrities' rights of publicity.
- Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013,1029 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
Salomon, supra note 38, at 1184.
Keller & Bernstein, supra note 32, at 434.
' Cray, supra note 64, at 662.
Id. at 663.
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The second possible solution that courts have used is the domi-
cile factor, on the basis that states are more likely to compensate
their own residents than foreigners injured within their borders.'36
This approach may be criticized as artificial, given the intangible
nature of the property in question here.'37 But if a state makes the
right of publicity a property right, the next logical step is to try to
delimit it geographically and use its situs as a guide in choice of law
questions. Also problematic is the fact that this approach is more
akin to privacy actions, where the cause of action is necessarily re-
lated to the celebrity; in right of publicity, on the other hand, it
may be assigned away or survive the death of the public figure.'
The attraction of this approach is that it would allow states to com-
pete with each other to attract celebrities to reside within their
borders, if it is worth their while to do so, and to custom-tailor re-
gimes most likely to meet their constituents' needs. The downside
to this is that it would allow celebrities to shop for the most protec-
tion, or to strike a balance between other factors determining
domicile and degree of publicity protection. Of course, this might
not be a downside at all.
One obvious objection to this argument is that states simply will
not compete for celebrity domicile. The immediate response is that
they might; tax revenues aside, having a sizable celebrity popula-
tion might increase tourism or even general positive exposure for a
state like Rhode Island. A deeper response is that it does not mat-
ter if states do not compete on the levels of right of publicity they
offer. If celebrity domicile is a matter of indifference, then there
will be no competition, and states will select other areas in which to
compete. The current variation in state law, however, suggests that
some competition might, in fact, exist. In Tennessee, for example,
at least one court has suggested that states take this incentive seri-
ously. "[I]t would be rational for the Tennessee courts to adopt a
policy enhancing the continued growth of Nashville and Memphis
Id. at 656 n.123 (citing Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d
821 (9th Cir. 1974)).
Id. at 655.
- Id.
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as centers for the lives and activities of music industry personali-
ties."" '
Cray suggests that the problems of a multistate publicity action
can be solved by adopting a strategy similar to that applied to
multistate defamation and privacy actions." "Over the years, prac-
tical necessity prompted widespread adoption of the rule that only
a single cause of action arose from multistate publication, a cause
of action governed by the law of one state. 141 Some states use the
law of the plaintiff's domicile in such cases.'
This choice of law discussion indicates that the problem is not in-
surmountable. If courts treat the right as traditional property, they
can use the state of domicile of the celebrity. If they wish to take
into account its more fluid status with regard to place, they can
choose the place of greatest infringement. Either rule is predictable
and permits states to fashion their own policies. Choosing the state
of domicile may even drive states to compete with each other for
celebrity residency, as federalism literature suggests they do for
bank charters and corporate charters.
VI. COMMUNITY PROPERTY: A CASE STUDY
The community property system in this country derives from the
Spanish legal tradition."3 Nine states (Arizona, California, Idaho,
Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wiscon-
sin) currently have community property regimes, but earlier, when
federal tax laws offered community property a beneficial income-
splitting effect, several common law states converted their property
regimes to community property, later reverting back to separate
property when the tax laws were changed."4 The existence of this
second, robust property system found in a substantial minority of
states is an example of the feasibility of having property laws that
vary significantly from state to state. The fact that some states have
11 Factors Etc. v. Pro Arts, 652 F.2d 278, 288 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting).
* Cray, supra note 64, at 665-66.
Id. at 666.
Id. at 666 n.187.
' Lawrence W. Waggoner et. al., Family Property Law: Cases And Materials On
Wills, Trusts, and Future Interests 518 (2d ed. 1997).
'" Id. at 519.
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switched back and forth and that Wisconsin only adopted commu-
nity property in 1986 suggests that property law is a legitimate area
in which states can experiment, and perhaps compete.
Of course, conflict of law questions arise as couples move be-
tween common law and community property states. Three general
conflict of law principles tend to control: The law of domicile at the
time of acquisition determines ownership; moving or changing
domicile does not change a person's legal interest in the property;
and, finally, the law of the state of domicile at death governs the
disposition of the property. 14S
There is one intriguing point implicit in drawing an analogy be-
tween the right of publicity and community property, one that gets
at the heart of characterizing the right as property at all. It is clear
that personal property acquired in a non-community-property state
cannot be converted into community property by taking it into a
community property state.'4' A statute so providing would be un-
constitutional, a breach of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
and a taking without due process. 47 If we determine a publicity
rights cause of action based on the state of domicile, and the celeb-
rity in changing domicile lost her publicity rights, would this be a
taking?" Rights once vested are not disturbed.'49 But when does a
right of publicity vest? Is it when a celebrity reaches some quantifi-
able level of fame? Is it when she gets her first "big break?" This
seems to make rights turn on fortuity of place where fame devel-
oped, but the alternative is to recognize a property right that can
change from state to state.
Given the fact that the characterization of the right of publicity
was done for expediency, to distinguish it from a privacy action,
but is now recognized as a legitimate free-standing right, a question
141 Hrant Norsigian, Note: Community Property and the Problem of Migration, 66
Wash. U. L.Q. 773,777-78 (1988).
14615A Am. Jur. 2d Community Property §17 (2000).
147Id.
48 Alternatively, if the choice of law rule applied is the state of greatest infringement
rule, a property right will not vest and disappear according to changes in domicile, but
according to the law of the state of greatest infringement. This is a perfectly good
solution, but it does not offer the same opportunities to explore the nature of the
property involved in the right of publicity.
149 Friedrich K. Juenger, Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws: A Tale of Two
Countries, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1061,1078 (1981).
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worth asking is: Should we continue to treat publicity rights as
property at all? On the other hand, how could states that have rec-
ognized the right of publicity as a property right ever go back? It
would seem impossible to take what appears to be a vested right
away. But states could question how much social value there is in
the power to assign this right or in having it survive death by one
hundred years. The laboratories of the states afford a chance to
work out how to create a proper balance between freedom of
speech concerns and the goal of protecting the use of one's iden-
tity. No clear consensus as to the ideal balance has arisen yet.
CONCLUSION
The existence of a community property system demonstrates
that all fifty states need not have uniform property regimes. Feder-
alism's promise of slowly working out a problem by tinkering with
variations until a workable model emerges is one that is relevant
even in today's rapidly changing world of media and image exploi-
tation. Dot-com age notwithstanding, property remains an area of
the law traditionally dominated by the states and slow to change.
Given the right of publicity's debatable labor and incentive justifi-
cations, it is wisest to avoid enshrining on the federal level a model
of persona protection that might cement into an unwieldy and op-
pressive regime.
In light of recent developments in intellectual property and the
Internet, the right of publicity tells us a story familiar in the law.
The increasing use of the marketing of public figures' personas, a
relatively new development, led to the rethinking of rights of pri-
vacy. The earlier legal protection no longer seemed adequate to
protect decidedly public figures. The solution, granting property
rights in the marketing of one's persona, gave celebrities power
over their images, but that power was limited by state law and
choice of law provisions. Federalism's best argument against a fed-
eral right of publicity is that property rights are state-created rights,
and these rights of publicity are relatively young in the property
law context. Calcifying them in federal law would be premature.
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